Investing in Mutual Funds with Regime Switching
There is now compelling evidence that economic systems occasionally transition from one state or regime to another. For example, the macroeconomy periodically switches between booms and recessions. Similarly, stock markets periodically transition between 'bull' and 'bear' market states with each state being characterized by distinctive dynamics. The presence of distinct regimes in economic time series can potentially have a significant impact on investor decisions.
1 One such decision concerns the selection of a portfolio of mutual funds by an investor. The importance of the fund selection decision may be gauged by the size of the assets invested in mutual funds, by the considerable resources devoted by investors to this task, and by their appetite for fund performance statistics and rankings that are widely disseminated by mass media outlets. A natural question that arises in this context is: "Are the potential regime shifts in the economy important for the fund selection decision, and if so, how should investors account for them in their decision making process?" This paper develops a framework for choosing a portfolio of mutual funds in the presence of regime switching in stock market returns. Specifically, I extend the Bayesian framework proposed by Pástor and Stambaugh (2002a, 2002b) to allow for regime uncertainty to be incorporated in the investment decision of the investor. I apply the proposed framework to study the optimal choices made by fund investors. The key findings, discussed below, are that the existence of regimes in market returns exerts a strong influence on investor fund choices. Furthermore, ignoring the existence of regimes imposes significant utility costs on investors.
I consider the problem of a mean-variance optimizing investor who chooses a portfolio of no-load stock mutual funds with the highest ex ante Sharpe ratio. The universe of funds available to the investor includes 513 no-load mutual funds that exist as of December 2004 in the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free US 1 For example, Bekaert (2002, 2004 ) study the impact of bull and bear market regimes on international asset allocation strategies and find that ignoring regime switching is costly when the investment set includes a conditionally risk free asset. In a multi-asset context, Sa-Aadu, Shilling, and Tiwari (2006) show that the optimal investor portfolios are tilted towards tangible assets such as real estate and precious metals during the bad economic states. Other examples include the studies by Guidolin and Timmermenn (2004), and Tu (2005) .
Mutual Fund Database. The investor believes that the stock market returns are characterized by two regimes, labeled the 'bull' and the 'bear' regimes. I consider a two-state Markov regime switching model in order to capture the dynamics of stock market returns. In the present context an appealing feature of a Markov regime switching model is that it can offer important diagnostic information through time. Such a model is particularly suited to the task of analyzing the performance of managed fund portfolios since it can provide a measure of fund performance that takes into account a fund manager's dynamic factor exposure strategy.
I explore a Bayesian framework that allows investors to make inference about mutual fund performance in the presence of regime switching in market returns. The investor's inference problem includes the estimation of the regime switching model, and the identification of the states. The identification of the states allows the investor to obtain estimates of the state-dependent parameters of the fund specific regression model used to evaluate fund performance. The investor combines her prior beliefs with the sample evidence to obtain estimates of the predictive return distribution of fund returns.
The moments of the predictive return distribution are then utilized by the investor in choosing the optimal portfolio of funds. Note that the incorporation of regime switching in the decision problem of the investor makes the task of obtaining the predictive return distribution, non-trivial. A key feature of the proposed framework of this paper is the use of the Gibbs sampling procedure to estimate the relevant parameters of interest. The use of the Gibbs sampling procedure makes it possible to estimate a high-dimensional system involving over 500 funds. Importantly, the framework allows for decision making in the context of a large number of assets without the need to specify or optimize the complete likelihood function -a task that would be extremely difficult, if not altogether infeasible, in the context of a regime switching model with several hundred assets and unobserved states.
Note that in addition to the uncertainty regarding the economic states, a fund investor also faces two other sources of uncertainty in making her fund selection decision. To see this, recall that the usual procedure for evaluating fund performance requires the investor to rely on a factor model. The investor estimates the parameters in a regression of excess fund returns on the excess returns of certain benchmark assets specified by an asset pricing model. The estimated intercept in such a regression, i.e., the fund alpha, is customarily viewed as a measure of skill or value added by the fund manager. The first uncertainty concerns the investor's prior belief regarding the degree of pricing error afflicting the asset pricing model used by her in evaluating fund performance. The second uncertainty relates to the investor's prior beliefs regarding the degree of skill possessed by the fund managers. For example, an investor, before examining the data, could potentially have complete confidence in a model such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Alternatively, she could be completely skeptical about the validity of the model. At the same time, the investor may possess a range of prior beliefs regarding the skill of mutual fund managers. In each case, the prior beliefs together with the sample evidence shape the investment choices made by the investor.
I find that across a range of prior beliefs regarding the pricing error of the CAPM and the 4-factor
Carhart (1997) model, as well as fund manager skill, accounting for regime switching in market returns exerts a strong influence on the optimal fund choices of the investor. Intuitively, recognizing the possibility of regimes in market returns allows the investor to identify and select funds with the desirable market exposure in each regime. In order to gauge the economic significance of regime switching for the fund selection decision I consider the ex ante utility of a mean-variance optimizing investor who recognizes the existence of regimes in market returns. I calculate the certainty equivalent loss experienced by this investor if she were to hold a portfolio that is optimal from the perspective of an investor who fails to account for regime switches in market returns. I find that the economic costs of ignoring regime switching are substantial. For example, an investor who has perfect prior confidence in the CAPM and whose prior beliefs rule out the possibility of managerial skill would experience a loss of 270 basis points per month in certainty equivalent terms. This represents a 90% loss in certainty equivalent terms relative to the investor's optimal portfolio choice. The corresponding utility loss from ignoring regime switching for an investor who has perfect prior confidence in the 4-factor Carhart model is 341 basis points per month, representing a 59% reduction relative to her optimal portfolio.
The costs of ignoring regime switching are somewhat lower for investors with a lesser degree of prior confidence in the model, but they continue to be significant. For instance, consider an investor who regards the CAPM with a degree of skepticism and whose prior beliefs attach a 5% probability to the event that asset returns will deviate from the CAPM's predictions by ± 4% per year. For such an investor the cost of ignoring regime switching still varies between 69 and 89 basis points per month depending on the strength of her prior beliefs in managerial skill.
This paper makes two contributions to the literature on investors' mutual fund selection decision.
First, it proposes a formal Bayesian framework to allow investors to incorporate regime switching uncertainty in their decision process. The proposed framework makes it feasible to address regime switching uncertainty even in the context of a portfolio allocation decision involving several hundred mutual funds. Second, the paper provides an assessment of the economic value of accounting for regime switching in market returns when selecting a portfolio of mutual funds. The paper is related to a number of recent studies that analyze the mutual fund choice decision within a Bayesian framework. It is closest in spirit to a series of important papers by Pástor and Stambaugh (2002a, 2002b) who develop a Bayesian framework that allows investors to combine prior beliefs about manager skill and model mispricing with the sample evidence in choosing a portfolio of funds. The present paper extends the Bayesian econometric framework developed by Pástor and Stambaugh to allow for the incorporation of regime switching uncertainty in the investor's fund selection decision. The results of this study suggest that this is potentially quite important from the standpoint of the investor's utility.
In related work Baks, Metrick, and Wachter (2001) investigate the set of prior beliefs about managerial skill that would imply zero investment in active mutual funds for a mean-variance investor.
They find that even under extremely skeptical prior beliefs, there is an economically significant allocation to active funds. Jones and Shanken (2005) study how inference about an individual fund's performance is affected by learning about the cross-sectional dispersion in the performance of a large number of other funds. Avramov and Wermers (2005) analyze the mutual fund investment decision in the presence of predictable returns. Busse and Irvine (2005) find that Bayesian estimates of fund alphas based on the Pástor and Stambaugh (2002a, 2002b) framework are able to predict future fund performance better than the standard frequentist measures of fund alphas. In contrast to this paper, none of the above studies allows for the possibility of regime switching in asset returns. Consequently, the present study addresses an unexplored issue in this literature, namely, the potential impact of regimes in market returns on the fund selection decision of investors.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I outlines the decision framework and the Bayesian methodology employed. Section II describes the data and the empirical results. Concluding remarks are offered in Section III.
I. Methodology and Decision Framework
I model the mutual fund selection problem of a Bayesian investor who recognizes the possibility that stock market returns are subject to two distinct regimes, labeled as 'bull' and 'bear' regimes for the sake of convenience. The investor's objective is to choose the portfolio of funds with the highest ex ante Sharpe ratio. In evaluating the candidate mutual funds, the investor makes use of her subjective prior beliefs regarding the skill possessed by, or equivalently, the value added by fund managers. The investor also has prior beliefs about the degree of pricing error inherent in an asset pricing model that is employed to evaluate fund performance. These prior beliefs when combined with sample evidence allow the investor to make an inference about the predictive return distributions for the set of candidate mutual funds available for investment at a point in time. The estimated moments of the predictive return distributions are then used as inputs in the optimization problem of the investor.
The possibility of regime switching in market portfolio returns makes the above problem nontrivial. One complication is that the state variable governing the evolution of regimes is unobserved.
Furthermore, even the simplest model of regime switching, gives rise to an extremely high-dimensional system as the number of candidate mutual funds available for investment is quite large. Below I describe the methodology used to address these issues. 
A. Specification of the Regime-Switching Model

B. Making inference about fund performance in the presence of model pricing uncertainty
The conventional measure of the skill of a fund manager is the fund alpha defined with respect to a benchmark model. In the context of the regime-switching framework, consider the following regression of a fund's returns on a set of k benchmark asset returns: 
The first term within parenthesis on the right hand side of Equation (4) may be interpreted as the fund's alpha, conditional on the state or regime, when the investor accounts for uncertainty about model pricing ability and managerial skill.
C. Specification of Prior Beliefs
Investors' prior beliefs about model pricing and skill are specified as follows. First consider the parameters of Equation (2). The prior distribution for the covariance matrix Σ of the error terms t N , ε is specified as inverted Wishart:
The prior precision matrix H is specified as
. I use an empirical Bayes approach to set the value of s 2 equal to the average of the diagonal elements of the sample OLS estimate of Σ using data for the period 1962 to 2004. I set the value of ν , the prior degrees of freedom, equal to m+3 in order to ensure that the prior contains little information. The priors for the slope coefficients B N in Equation (2) are assumed to be diffuse. Conditional on , the prior for is specified as:
The above specification links the conditional prior covariance matrix for N α to Σ and is similar to that employed by Pástor and Stambaugh (1999 , 2002a , 2002b and Pástor (2000) . 4 A variety of prior beliefs regarding the pricing ability of an asset pricing model can be allowed for by choosing different values for , the standard deviation of the marginal prior distribution for the elements of 
Conditional on
, the prior for managerial skill for a given fund, , is specified to be identical across regimes, as a Normal distribution,
The prior specification in Equation (6) is motivated by the fact that one can achieve portfolios of passive assets with large Sharpe ratios if the elements of are large when the elements of MacKinlay (1995) ).
Making the conditional prior covariance matrix of N α proportional to t S Σ , as in (6), results in a lower prior probability of such an event relative to the case when the elements of N α are distributed independently of
Note that under the above specification, the prior variance of A δ is directly proportional to fund residual variance, . Intuitively, if the benchmark assets do a poor job of explaining the variance of the fund's returns (i.e., is high), the manager is more likely to be able to deliver a large value of ). Such a specification implicitly assumes that when the fund manager is believed to be skilled, portfolio turnover is not necessarily a deadweight cost that negatively impacts fund performance. In other words, given the possibility of managerial skill, high portfolio turnover is likely to be accompanied by high performance.
Next consider the priors for the slope coefficients in Equation ( Similarly, the estimated cross-sectional mean and variance of the fund-specific residuals, , are utilized in the above specification of the prior for c 2 u σ A . Note that the prior beliefs with respect to the fund specific coefficients are assumed to be similar across the two regimes.
A c
The priors for the conditional expected benchmark returns vector, , and the covariance matrix of benchmark returns, , are assumed to be diffuse:
Finally, the prior distributions for the transition probabilities, P and Q, are assumed to be independent beta distributions with hyperparameters 2 , 1 , ,
Let R denote the returns on the benchmark and non-benchmark assets, as well as the mutual funds, through month T and let θ denote the parameters of the model. With the above complete specification of priors, the investor forms her posterior beliefs in light of the sample information:
In choosing the fund portfolio with the highest Sharpe ratio, the investor makes use of the predictive return distributions for the candidate funds. The next subsection formally describes the investment problem of the investor as well as the choice of benchmark model/assets and the nonbenchmark assets utilized in making inference about individual fund performance.
D. The Investor's Decision Problem
The investor chooses a portfolio of no-load stock mutual funds with the highest ex ante Sharpe ratio as of December 2004. The investor uses the moments of the predictive distribution of fund returns in computing the Sharpe ratios and in solving the optimization problem. The predictive return distribution may be expressed as,
In the context of the regime switching model considered here and given the large number of individual funds analyzed, the predictive density is not readily obtained. Note that when the investment universe consists of several hundred mutual funds, there are potentially several thousand parameters to be estimated. Accordingly, parameter estimation via the usual method of optimizing the associated likelihood function (see, for example, Hamilton (1989)) becomes extremely difficult.
In order to address this problem I adopt the Gibbs sampling procedure. The use of the Gibbs sampler for the Bayesian analysis of Markov-switching models was popularized by Albert and Chib (1993) . The Gibbs sampling procedure is a Markov chain Monte Carlo method that allows the approximation of joint and marginal distributions by sampling repeatedly from the known conditional distributions. The technique is particularly suited to the kind of problem considered here in which the joint density may not be known. However, if the set of conditional densities are known, one can sequentially sample from the conditional density of each parameter (or blocks of parameters), beginning with an arbitrary starting value for the some initial parameters. The unobserved state variable S T is also treated as an unknown parameter and is generated from its distribution conditional on the other parameters of the model. After a suitable number of burn-in iterations, the Gibbs-sampler is expected to have converged and the subsequent draws of the parameters can be used to conduct inference.
In the context of this paper I employ the Gibbs sampling procedure to obtain estimates of the parameters of interest including the moments of the predictive return distribution of the funds. For each case representing an investor with certain set of prior beliefs, 1000 Gibbs draws are made after discarding an initial burn-in set of 1000 draws.
6 The (state dependent) moments of the predictive return distribution of the funds estimated from these draws are then used by the investor in her optimization problem. The relevant moments are detailed in the appendix. When the investor takes the possibility of regime switching into account she uses the two sets of moments (i.e., one set per state) along with the inferred stationary probabilities of each state, to construct the (unconditional) vector of expected excess returns and covariance matrix for the 513 funds. 7 These moments form the basis of fund allocations under regime switching.
To assess the economic costs of ignoring regime switching, I also compute the optimal fund allocations from the perspective of an investor who ignores regime switching in market returns. These allocations are based on the moments of the predictive return distribution estimated without accounting for regime switching in the market returns. A comparison of the certainty equivalent rates of return (CERs) for the optimal portfolios formed under regime switching versus when regime switching is ignored, provides an measure of the utility costs of ignoring regime switching. I compute the certainty equivalent rate of return (CER) for a given portfolio chosen by the investor, assuming a mean-variance objective,
I use a number of formal diagnostic procedures to ensure that the Gibbs sampler has achieved convergence. These include the use of diagnostics proposed by Raftery and Lewis (1995) and Geweke (1992) . 7 Let and be the vector of expected excess fund returns in each state with the corresponding covariance matrices denoted by and , respectively. Then the (unconditional) expected return vector is given by where and are the stationary probabilities for the two states. 
II. Empirical Analysis
A. Sample Description
I obtain a sample of domestic no-load stock mutual funds from the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free US Mutual Fund Database. Funds are selected from one of three categories, namely, "Aggressive Growth", "Growth and Income", and "Growth" based on classification codes provided by Wiesenberger ("OBJ"),
ICDI ("ICDI_OBJ"), and Strategic Insight ("SI_OBJ"). To be eligible for inclusion, a fund is required to be in existence as of December 2004 and to have at least six years of returns history. Sector funds and specialized funds are specifically excluded. I also exclude multiple share classes of the same fund. This selection procedure yields a sample of 513 unique no-load funds which is described in Table I . As can be seen from the table, funds in the "Growth" category are the most numerous although the "Growth and
Income" funds account for the bulk of the assets at $362.76 billion. The "Aggressive Growth" funds have the highest average expense ratio at 1.09 percent while the "Growth and Income" category has the lowest expense ratio at 0.57 percent. The latter category of funds also has the lowest annual turnover rate at 41.5 percent. Figure I plots the time series of the posterior mean of the probability of the market being in the 'bear' regime. As can be seen from the figure the probability of being in the 'bear' regime peaks during some well known episodes in the stock market including the market crash of October 1987, as well as the market declines during April 1970 , October 1974 , March 1980 , and August, 1998 others. Interestingly, the 'bear' market probability is seen to be at an all time low during late 1995 -a period highlighted by the initial public offering of equity by Netscape which marked the start of the technology driven boom in the market over the next several years. Next, I examine the impact of these regimes on the fund choices of investors. Tables III and IV ), the optimal fund portfolios consist exclusively of actively managed funds. As expected, in these cases, the chosen portfolios' correlations with the market portfolio are markedly lower.
B. Estimates of the Regime Switching Model
C. Optimal Mutual Fund Choices When Ignoring Regime Switching
The qualitative patterns noted above also hold true for the optimal fund portfolios formed when investor beliefs are centered on the 4-factor Carhart model that includes the returns on a factor mimicking portfolio for the momentum factor in addition to the three Fama-French factors. When the investor's prior beliefs rule out the possibility of managerial skill, the optimal fund portfolio is chosen to mimic the portfolio representing the optimal combination of the four benchmark factors. As the degree of prior confidence in the pricing model is lowered, and when the prior beliefs allow for the possibility of managerial skill, the optimal fund portfolios are more heavily invested in active funds. Collectively, the results in Tables III and IV highlight the importance of prior beliefs regarding model pricing error and fund manager skill in determining the optimal fund choices of the investor.
D. Optimal Mutual Fund Choices With Regime Switching
I next examine the composition of optimal fund portfolios when investors explicitly account for the possibility of regime switching. Recall that an investor who accounts for regime switching in market returns uses as her optimization inputs, the weighted average of the two sets of state-dependent moments of the fund return distributions. The weights represent the stationary probabilities for the two states as inferred from the estimated transition probability matrix. The implied stationary probabilities for states 1 and 2 are 0.34 and 0.66, respectively. Tables V and VI present results for the cases when investor beliefs are centered on the CAPM, and the 4-factor Carhart model, respectively. For each case representing a combination of prior beliefs in the model under consideration and managerial skill, the tables report the top five fund holdings in the optimal portfolio. It is apparent from Table V (a similar conclusion emerges from Table VI) that accounting for potential regime switches significantly impacts the optimal fund choices. In particular, it may be inferred that allocations are now spread out over a larger number of funds as the top five holdings collectively account for less than 20 percent of the portfolio in each case.
Furthermore, the allocations to index funds appear to be diminished even in cases where the possibility of managerial skill is ruled out ( 0 = δ σ ). Intuitively, under regime switching, suitable combinations of active funds exist that may dominate pure index fund portfolio combinations. To see this, note that an investor who accounts for regime switching in market returns, is aware of the fact that the risk premium on the market portfolio (RMRF) is in fact negative in the 'bear' market state. Hence, her optimal fund allocation would reflect a desire to hedge against this outcome in the 'bear' state. Accordingly, her exposure to index funds that stay fully invested in the market would be lower relative to the optimal fund portfolio of an investor who ignores the existence of distinct regimes in market returns.
Further insight into the characteristics of the portfolios that result from an explicit recognition of the possibility of regime switches in market returns is provided by Panel B of Table V. The panel reports the betas of the chosen portfolios in the 'bear' and the 'bull' states for each set of prior beliefs.
Interestingly, in each case the chosen portfolio has a beta close to zero in the 'bear' state and a beta that is positive and relatively high in the 'bull' state. Hence, the recognition of regime switching in market returns leads the investor to select a portfolio that has a desirable market exposure in each state. Of course, the relevant question to ask is "Does recognition of regime switching matter from the perspective of investor welfare?" I address this issue in the next subsection.
E. Is it Costly to Ignore Regime Switching When Selecting Mutual Funds?
Table VII presents the differences in certainty equivalent rates of return (CER) for fund portfolios that are optimally chosen under a given set of beliefs and when accounting for regime switches relative to portfolios that are optimal for the same beliefs but when regime switching is ignored. From the perspective of an investor who believes in regime switching, the latter set of portfolios is likely to be suboptimal. The relevant question is whether the differences are meaningful in the eyes of the investor. The CER differences reported in Table VII help answer this question. The certainty equivalents are computed using the predictive moments perceived by the investor who accounts for the possibility of regime switches. The investor is assumed to optimize her utility defined over the mean and variance of the fund portfolio. She is also assumed to have a coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 2.25. 10 In calculating the CER figures, short positions in fund portfolios are ruled out. Investors are however allowed to take long positions in the chosen optimal fund portfolio by borrowing at the risk free rate subject to a 50% margin requirement that is consistent with the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation T. Intuitively, the CER differentials provide an economic measure of the importance of regime switching for the investor's mutual fund selection decision. Another way to interpret these differences is to think of them as the utility loss experienced by an investor who believes in regime switching but is forced to hold the sub-optimal portfolio based on ignoring the possibility of regime switches.
Panel A of Table VII reports the CER differences when the investor is less than completely skeptical (i.e., ∞ < N α σ ) about the pricing ability of the two models considered here. It is clear that the costs of ignoring regime switching are substantial in economic terms. An investor who has complete faith in the pricing ability of the CAPM and who rules out the possibility of fund manager skill, experiences a 90% reduction in certainty equivalent terms (270 basis points per month) if forced to ignore the possibility of regime switches. To understand this utility loss, note that an investor with complete confidence in the pricing ability of the CAPM but who recognizes the existence of two distinct regimes, will take into account the fact that the market portfolio's expected return in the 'bear' state is in fact, quite poor. Her optimal fund portfolio will reflect this possibility and will be tailored to provide a hedge against such a market downturn (see, for example, the characteristics of the chosen portfolios in Panel B of Table   V ). On the other hand, an investor with complete confidence in the CAPM, but who ignores the existence of regimes will choose to always hold a portfolio of funds that has a high correlation with the market portfolio. The corresponding utility loss for beliefs anchored on the 4-factor Carhart model under extreme skepticism about managerial skill, is a decrease in CER of 91 basis points per month, i.e., a reduction of 83% relative to the optimal portfolio choice. Admitting the possibility of managerial skill mitigates these differences although they continue to be large in economic terms.
Note that in calculating the CER differences in Table VII , it is assumed that the investor may hold leveraged positions in the optimal mutual fund portfolio subject to a 50% margin requirement that is consistent with Regulation T of the Federal Reserve. A natural question to ask is: "How significant are the CER differences when margin purchases of the optimal mutual fund portfolio are disallowed?" Table VIII helps shed light on this issue. Table VIII that while per month or a 30% reduction relative to the optimal fund portfolio. For a more moderate degree of confidence in the model or when the investor is less skeptical about the possibility of fund manager skill, the CER differences decline. Nevertheless, even when the investor admits the possibility of unbounded managerial skill levels and has a moderate confidence in the model's pricing ability the utility costs of ignoring regime switching are economically significant at 15 basis points per month.
It is clear from the results in
Similarly, as seen from Panel B of Table VIII, the utility costs of ignoring regime switching continue to be substantial even when the investor is completely skeptical of the pricing ability of the two models. For example, when the investor anchors her beliefs on the CAPM but is extremely skeptical of managerial skill ( 0 = δ σ ), her perceived utility loss from ignoring regime switching is 23 basis points in certainty equivalent terms, representing a 39% reduction relative to her optimal fund portfolio choice. The corresponding CER reduction for beliefs anchored on the 4-factor Carhart model under extreme skepticism about managerial skill, is 45 basis points per month, i.e., a reduction of 71% relative to the optimal portfolio choice. Once again admitting the possibility of managerial skill reduces these differences although they continue to be fairly large in economic terms.
In summary, the results of this subsection suggest that the economic costs of ignoring regime switching in the fund investment decision are substantial. This holds true across a range of beliefs regarding uncertainty about model pricing error and fund manager skill. I also find that the costs are most pronounced when the investor has high confidence in the relevant asset pricing model.
III. Conclusion
This paper makes two contributions to the literature on investors' mutual fund selection decision within a Bayesian framework. First, it proposes a framework that allows an investor to incorporate regime switching uncertainty in their decision process. The proposed framework relies on the Gibbs sampling procedure and makes it feasible to address regime switching uncertainty in the context of a portfolio allocation decision involving several hundred mutual funds. Second, the paper provides an assessment of the economic value of accounting for regime switching in market returns when selecting a portfolio of mutual funds.
Specifically, I consider the problem of a mean-variance optimizing investor who chooses a portfolio of no-load stock mutual funds with the highest ex ante Sharpe ratio. The universe of funds available to the investor consists of 513 no-load stock mutual funds with at least six years of return history and which exist as of December 2004 in the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free US Mutual Fund Database.
The investor believes that the stock market returns are characterized by two regimes, labeled the 'bull' and the 'bear' regimes. I consider a two-state Markov regime switching model in order to capture the dynamics of stock market returns. The proposed framework allows the investor to incorporate prior beliefs regarding pricing error in the asset pricing model used for performance evaluation as well as beliefs about managerial skill. Hence, the framework proposed here extends the analysis of Pastor and Stambaugh (2002a, 2002b) by allowing for regime uncertainty to be considered in addition to investor uncertainty regarding model pricing error and fund manager skill.
I find that for a range of prior beliefs regarding the pricing error of the CAPM and the 4-factor Carhart model, and fund manager skill, recognizing regime switching in market returns exerts a powerful influence on the fund choices of the investor. Intuitively, the explicit recognition of regime switching in the decision process of the investor leads to the choice of a fund portfolio that has the desirable market exposure in each state or regime. For example, when investor beliefs are anchored on the CAPM, in each of the cases examined the chosen fund portfolio has a beta close to zero in the 'bear' regime and a beta that is positive and relatively high in the 'bull' regime. In order to gauge the economic significance of regime switching for the fund selection decision I calculate the certainty equivalent loss experienced by the investor if she were to ignore the regime switches in market returns. I find that the economic costs of ignoring regime switching are substantial. For example, an investor who has perfect prior confidence in the CAPM and whose prior beliefs rule out the possibility of managerial skill would experience a loss of 90% (270 basis points per month) in certainty equivalent terms. The corresponding utility loss from ignoring regime switching for an investor who has perfect prior confidence in the 4-factor Carhart model is 341 basis points per month, representing a 59% reduction relative to her optimal portfolio.
The costs of ignoring regime switching for investors with a lesser degree of prior confidence in the model continue to be substantial. Consider for instance, an investor who regards the CAPM with a degree of skepticism and whose prior beliefs attach a 5% probability to the event that asset returns will deviate from the CAPM's predictions by ± 4% per year. For such an investor the cost of ignoring regime switching still varies between 69 and 89 basis points per month depending on her prior beliefs in managerial skill.
The central message of this paper is that it is important for investors to recognize the potential regime switches in benchmark returns when evaluating and investing in mutual funds. The analysis presented here can be extended in a number of directions. For example, an obvious extension would be to examine the performance of fund selection strategies that account for regime switches in benchmark returns when making decisions in real-time. Similarly, the analysis can be readily adapted to alternative investor objectives when choosing the mutual fund portfolio. Examples of such alternative objectives may include the optimization of the information ratio, or the maximization of a suitable utility function defined over terminal wealth in a multi-period setting. I leave these tasks for future research. conditional on the set of other parameters in the model including the transition probabilities P and Q. The conditioning features of the model allow the states to be simulated via the Gibbs sampling procedure. Specifically, the multi-move Gibbs sampling algorithm (see, for example, Kim and Nelson (1999) ) is employed for this purpose.
Briefly, the generation of the states involves the following procedure. Beginning with arbitrary initial values for the parameters of the model, the following steps may be iterated until convergence is obtained:
Step 1. Generate each S t from the joint posterior conditional density ( ) 
Step 2. Generate the transition probabilities, P and Q from the conditional density, ( )
Step 3. Generate θ from ( ) 
Given the assumed priors mentioned previously, the posterior distributions of the covariance matrix of residuals from (A.1) and the slope coefficients, are given by
The posterior moments of the slope coefficients and the covariance matrix are given by
and D is ( ) ( )
, and all other elements are zero.
The relevant posterior moments of the benchmark returns are: 
Suppressing the superscripts for the regimes or states, the regression model in Equation ( The fund's expected return, E A , is calculated as 1 , .8) where
is the vector of expected returns on all passive assets. The fund's standard deviation of returns, δ A , is calculated from the same equation as Under the assumed (beta) conjugate prior distributions for the transition probabilities P and Q, their conditional posterior distributions are independent beta distributions. These are noted below in the description of the Gibbs sampling algorithm.
Details of the Gibbs sampling procedure
In order to obtain the regime-dependent moments of the funds' return distributions, I draw samples from the joint posterior distribution of the relevant parameters as described below. 
where the parameters of the Wishart distribution are state dependent but the superscript S t is suppressed for these parameters. Panel A of the table shows the portfolios of no-load funds with the highest ex ante Sharpe ratios when the investor ignores regime switching. Investor prior beliefs are characterized by varying levels of confidence in the CAPM and varying levels of confidence in the skill of fund managers. Portfolio weights in some columns may not sum to 100 percents as funds having less than 2 percent allocation under each scenario are not shown. Panel B shows the correlation of each fund portfolio with the value-weighted market portfolio of stocks computed with respect to the predictive distribution used to derive the fund portfolio. The universe of candidate funds available for investment consists of 513 no-load stock mutual funds with at least six years of return history through December 2004. This table compares the certainty equivalent rates of return (CER) for portfolios that have the highest ex ante Sharpe ratio when the investor accounts for regime switching in market returns to the CER of the corresponding optimal portfolios for the case when regime switching is ignored. In each case the overall portfolio of the investor precludes any short positions in the optimal mutual fund portfolio while also ruling out any leveraged positions. Both portfolios are formed under a given set of investor prior beliefs regarding model pricing error uncertainty and skill uncertainty. The table reports the CER differences for each pair of portfolios. In each case the CER difference represents the utility loss suffered by a mean-variance optimizing investor who is aware of the regime switches in market returns, but is forced to invest in the fund portfolio that is optimal when regime switching is ignored. The relative risk aversion of the investor is assumed to be 2.25. The universe of candidate funds available for investment consists of 513 no-load stock mutual funds with at least six years of return history through December 2004. 
